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Abstract. This paper puts forward a generic intrusion-avoidance architecture to 
be used for deploying web services on the cloud. The architecture, targeting the 
IaaS cloud providers, avoids intrusions by employing software diversity at 
various system levels and dynamically reconfiguring the cloud deployment 
environment. The paper studies intrusions caused by vulnerabilities of system 
software and discusses an approach allowing the system architects to decrease 
the risk of intrusions. This solution will also reduce the so-called system’s 
days-of-risk which is calculated as a time period of an increased security risk 
between the time when a vulnerability is publicly disclosed to the time when a 
patch is available to fix it. 
1   Introduction 
Dependability is a system property which includes several attributes: availability, 
reliability, safety, security, etc [1]. In this paper we focus on ensuring security of web 
services by protecting them from malicious attacks that exploit vulnerabilities of 
system components. A computer system providing web services consists of hardware 
and a multitier system architecture playing the role of a deployment environment for 
the specific applications. The dependability of the deployment environment 
significantly affects the dependability of the services provided. 
A web service application can be created as servlets and server pages, java beans, 
stored database procedures and triggers run in a specific deployment environment. 
This environment is constructed from a number of software components (Fig. 1). 
Typical examples of system components for web services are operating system (OS), 
web and application servers (AS and WS), and data base management systems 
(DBMS). 
Vulnerabilities of operating system and system software represent threats to 
dependability and, in particular, to security, that are additional to faults, errors and 
failures traditionally dealt with by the dependability community [1, 2].  
Intrusion tolerance is a general technique, which aims at tolerating system 
vulnerabilities that have been disclosed and can be exploited by an attacker. This is an 
active area of research and development with many useful solutions proposed (e.g. [3, 
4, 5]). However, traditionally the focus has been on intrusion detection (e.g. [6, 7]), or 
combining different security methods [8, 9] (intrusion detection systems and 
firewalls, authentication and authorisation techniques, etc.). Less attention has been 
given to understanding how to make systems less vulnerable and to avoid intrusions 
while being configured and integrated out of COTS-components, such as OS, WS, 
AS, and DBMS.  
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Fig. 1. General multitier architecture of a web system 
In the paper we propose a general system architecture aiming at decreasing the risk of 
intrusion and reducing number of days-of-risk [10]. This architecture employs the 
diversity of the system software components and uses a dynamical reconfiguration 
strategy taking into account the current number of vulnerabilities (and their severity) 
of each component.  
Such vulnerability information can be obtained by querying existing vulnerability 
databases (e.g. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, CVE and National 
Vulnerability Database, NVD), publicly available in the Internet. Besides, an 
implementation of the proposed architecture relies on the emerging cloud 
infrastructure services [11], known as Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). IaaS 
provides a platform virtualization environment and APIs that can enable such 
dynamic reconfiguration by switching between pre-built images of the diverse 
deployment environments. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe a general 
architecture of intrusion-avoidance deployment environment making use of diversity 
of systems components and dynamical reconfiguration. Section 3 investigates 
diversity of the system software used as a deployment environment for modern Web 
applications. In Section 4 we discuss the vulnerabilities of some popular operating 
systems and demonstrate the feasibility of the approach proposed.  
2   Intrusion-Avoidance Architecture 
2.1   Diversity of Deployment Environment  
Design diversity is one of the most efficient methods of providing software fault-
tolerance [12]. In regard to multitier architecture of web-services, software diversity 
can be applied at the level of the operating system, web and application servers, data 
base management systems and, finally, for application software, both separately and 
in many various combinations. It is an obvious fact that some system software 
components may be incompatible with each other (i.e. Microsoft IIS and MS SQL 
can be run only on MS Windows OS series and incompatible with other operating 
systems). Hence, this fact should be also taken into account during the multiversion 
environment integration and selection of the particular system configuration.  
Platform-independent Java technologies provide the crucial support for applying 
diversity of different system components. Thanks to JVM, Java applications can be 
run on different operating systems under control of various web and applications 
servers (see Table 1). These components form a flexible deployment environment 
running the same application software and allowing to be dynamically reconfigured 
by replacing one component by another one of the same functionality (e.g. GlassFish 
AS can be replaced with Oracle WebLogic, or IBM WebSphere, etc.). At the same 
time, the .NET applications can employ only restricted diversity of the deployment 
environment limited to Microsoft Windows series of operating systems and different 
versions of Internet Information Server and MS SQL.  
Table 1. Diversity level and diversity components of Java deployment environment. 
Diversity Level Diverse system components 
Operating 
Systems (OS) 
WinNT Series, MacOS X Server, Linux, FreeBSD, IBM AIX, 
Oracle Solaris, HP-UX, etc 
Web-server 
(WS) 
Apache httpd, Oracle iPlanet Web Server, IBM HTTP Server, 
lighttpd, nginx, Cherokee HTTP Server, etc 
Application 
server (AS) 
GlassFish, Geronimo, Oracle WebLogic, JBoss, Caucho Resin, 
IBM WebSphere, SAP NetWeaver, Apple WebObjects, etc 
DBMS MS SQL Server, MySQL, Oracle Database, Firebird, PostgreSQL, SAP SQL Anywhere, etc 
2.2   Intrusion-avoidance architecture making use of system components 
diversity 
The proposed intrusion avoidance approach is based on the idea of running at the 
different levels of the multitier system architecture (OS, WS, AS and DBMS) only 
those components having the least number of vulnerabilities. The rest diverse 
components should be hold in a stand-by mode.  
When a new vulnerability is disclosed, the most vulnerable system component 
should be replaced with the diverse one having fewer numbers of open (i.e. yet 
unpatched) vulnerabilities. Such dynamic reconfiguration should also take into 
account severity and potential harmful consequences of different vulnerabilities, their 
popularity, availability of exploit code, etc. When a product vendor patches some 
vulnerability the system can be reconfigured again (after patch installation and re-
estimation of the security risks). To compare the vulnerability level of the diverse 
components and spare configurations the weighted metrics can be used (1), (2). The 
proposed metrics estimating the system security risk can be also extended by taking 
into account other vulnerability attributes apart from severity and popularity. 
 ∑
=
⋅= i
N
j
jji PSVLC
1
, (1) 
where VLCi – vulnerability level (security risk) of the i-th system component; Ni – 
number of open (yet unpatched) vulnerabilities of the i-th component; Sj – severity of 
the j-th vulnerability; Pj – popularity of the j-th vulnerability. 
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where VLSk – vulnerability level (security risk) of the k-th system configuration; Mk – 
number of system components (usually, each system configuration uses four basic 
system components: OS, WS, AS, DBMS); VLCi – vulnerability level (security risk) 
of the i-th system component.  
The general intrusion-avoidance architecture is presented in Fig. 2. The 
architecture employs the IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service) cloud technology [11] 
providing crucial support for dynamic reconfiguration, storage and maintenance of 
the images of spare diverse system configurations. The core part of such architecture 
is a configuration controller. It retrieves information about emerging vulnerabilities of 
the different software system components and information about patches and security 
advisories released by the companies (product owners). By analysing such 
information the configuration controller estimates current security risks, selects the 
less vulnerable system configuration and activates it. Other functions performed by 
the controller are patch and settings management of the active and spare diverse 
configuration. 
3   Demonstration and Simulation 
In this section we analyze vulnerability statistics of different operating systems 
gathered during 2010 year and show how the security risks would be reduced by 
employing the proposed intrusion-avoidance technique. To perform a demonstration 
we have developed the testbed software implementing the functionality of the 
configuration controller (see Fig. 3) and have simulated its decision-making and 
reconfiguration process by use of operating systems vulnerability statistics.  
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Fig. 2. General architecture of the cloud-based intrusion-avoidance deployment environment 
 
Fig. 3. Basic configuration controller’s functionality: UML Activity diagram 
3.1   Vulnerability Databases 
There are a number of databases (supported by commercial and government institutions) 
gathering and publicly providing information about software vulnerabilities: CVE 
(cve.mitre.org), NVD (nvd.nist.gov), XForce (xforce.iss.net), CERT (www.cert.org), 
Secunia (secunia.com), etc. They help customers and product owners in identifying and 
solving the known security problems. The most reputable and complete databases are 
CVE and NVD, providing XML-formatted vulnerability information. This information 
(see Fig. 4) includes a unique vulnerability identifier <vuln:cve-id> and the date of 
its disclosure <vuln:published-datetime>, vulnerability description 
<vuln:summary>, severity <cvss:score> and impact attributes (impact on 
confidentiality <cvss:confidentiality-impact>, integrity <cvss:integrity-
impact> and availability <cvss:availability-impact>), the list of vulnerable 
software <vuln:vulnerable-software-list> and other related data.  
 
<entry id="CVE-2010-0020"> 
  <vuln:vulnerable-software-list> 
    <vuln:product> 
      cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008::sp2:x32 
    </vuln:product> 
     ... 
  </vuln:vulnerable-software-list> 
  <vuln:cve-id>CVE-2010-0020</vuln:cve-id> 
  <vuln:published-datetime>2010-02-10T13:30:00 
  </vuln:published-datetime> 
   ... 
  <vuln:cvss> 
    <cvss:score>9.0</cvss:score> 
    <cvss:access-vector>NETWORK</cvss:access-vector> 
    <cvss:access-complexity>LOW</cvss:access-complexity> 
    <cvss:confidentiality-impact>COMPLETE 
    </cvss:confidentiality-impact> 
    <cvss:integrity-impact>COMPLETE</cvss:integrity-impact> 
    <cvss:availability-impact>COMPLETE</cvss:availability-impact> 
    <cvss:source>http://nvd.nist.gov</cvss:source> 
  </vuln:cvss> 
   ... 
  <vuln:cwe id="CWE-94" /> 
  <vuln:cwe id="CWE-20" /> 
  <vuln:references xml:lang="en" reference_type="UNKNOWN"> 
    <vuln:source>MS</vuln:source> 
    <vuln:reference href="http://www.microsoft.com/technet/    
      security/Bulletin/MS10-012.mspx" xml:lang="en">MS10-012 
    </vuln:reference> 
  </vuln:references> 
  <vuln:summary>The SMB implementation in the Server service in 
Microsoft Windows Server 2008 SP2 does not properly validate 
request fields, which allows remote authenticated users to 
execute arbitrary code via a malformed request, aka "SMB 
Pathname Overflow Vulnerability." </vuln:summary> 
</entry> 
Fig. 4. Fragment of NVD’s vulnerability record: an example 
Unfortunately, none of existing vulnerability databases provides centralized 
information about patches and fixes available and exact dates of their issue. This 
complicates estimation of days-of-risk for each particular vulnerability. Assessment 
of the security risk and estimation of the number of open (i.e. yet unpatched) 
vulnerabilities of some particular software component can be done on the base of on-
line monitoring of both vulnerability databases and vendor security bulletins.  
To browse and query the NVD database we have developed a special software tool 
called NVDView. This tool allows to get an aggregated vulnerability information 
about the specified software product during the specified period of time. The results 
of vulnerability analysis of different operating systems obtained with the help of 
NVDView tool are discussed in the next section. 
3.2   Operating systems vulnerability analysis 
In this section we provide a retrospective vulnerability statistical analysis of the 
different operating systems using information provided by NVD database. Table 2 
reports a number of vulnerabilities disclosed during 2010 for Novel Linux v.11, 
RedHat Linux v.5, Apple MacOS Server v.10.5.8, Sun/Oracle Solaris v.10 and 
Microsoft Windows Server 2008.  
Table 2. A number of vulnerabilities disclosed in 2010 for different operating systems. 
Number of vulnerabilities disclosed per month Operating 
System Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Total 
number 
Novel Linux 11 3 7 5 11 5 4 0 1 33 5 18 23 115 
RedHat Linux 5 3 7 5 11 6 4 0 1 32 4 18 23 114 
Apple MacOS 
Server 10.5.8 2 0 25 0 0 10 0 3 0 0 18 0 58 
Sun/Oracle 
Solaris 10 1 1 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 11 0 0 23 
MS Windows 
Server 2008 3 16 8 14 2 5 2 14 5 6 0 16 91 
 
It is clear, that the total (cumulative) number of vulnerabilities is not the best security 
metric to compare different software product. Since some period of time after 
vulnerability disclosure (called days-of-risk [10]) the product vendor issues a patch to 
fix the vulnerability. Thus, the most important characteristics is a number of the 
residual or open (i.e. yet unpatched) vulnerabilities. Cumulative and residual numbers 
of vulnerabilities for different operating systems starting from January, 1 2010 until 
December, 31 2010 is shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. Unfortunately, none of the existing 
vulnerability databases provides the exact dates for patching the issues. As a result, it 
is not possible to estimate precisely how many vulnerabilities have remained 
unpatched by the specified date. Thus, in our work we used the following two basic 
assumptions:  
1. We did not take into account number of residual vulnerabilities by the 1st of 
January 2010;  
2. To eliminate fixed vulnerabilities in the Fig. 5 we used an average days-of-risk 
statistics provided in [13] (according to this survey, Microsoft Windows in average has 
28.9 days-of risk; Novel Linux – 73.89 days-of risk; Red Hat Linux – 106.83  days-of 
risk; Apple Mac OS – 46.12 days-of risk and Sun Solaris – 167.72 days-of risk).  
We believe that assumptions used do not affect our results as the purpose of this 
section is not to compare security of different operating systems but to demonstrate 
effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed intrusion-avoidance technique making 
use of operating systems diversity. 
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Fig. 5. Cumulative number of vulnerabilities in 2010 for different operating systems. 
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Fig. 6. Number of residual vulnerabilities in 2010 for different operating systems. 
3.3   Simulation of dynamic reconfiguration strategy making use of operating 
system diversity 
The results of dynamic operating system reconfigurations performed by the 
configuration controller taking into account the number of residual vulnerabilities 
(see Fig. 6) are summarized in Table 3. To simplify our demonstration we took out of 
consideration severity of different vulnerabilities.  
In our simulation we used Novel Linux v.11 as the initial active operating system. 
Table 3 shows the set of subsequent switches between different operating systems in 
accordance with the vulnerability discovering and patch issuing process (see Fig. 5). 
The table also presents the exact dates and periods of active operation of different 
operating systems. In our simulation, the overall period of the active operation for 
Novel Linux v.11 was 33 days; for Apple MacOS Server v.10.5.8 – 152 days; for 
Sun/Oracle Solaris v.10 – 116 days and for MS Windows Server 2008 – 64 days.  
Table 3. Operating systems reconfiguration summary. 
Operation period 
№ Active operating system start date end date duration
Average number 
of open 
vulnerabilities 
1 Novel Linux v.11 01.01.2010 17.01.2010 17 0 
2 Apple MacOS Server v.10.5.8 18.01.2010 18.01.2010 1 0 
3 Novel Linux v.11 19.01.2010 25.01.2010 7 0.86 
4 Sun/Oracle Solaris v.10 26.01.2010 06.03.2010 40 1.8 
5 Apple MacOS Server v.10.5.8 07.03.2010 29.03.2010 23 0 
6 MS Windows Server 2008 30.03.2010 30.03.2010 1 1 
7 Sun/Oracle Solaris v.10 31.03.2010 14.05.2010 45 2 
8 Apple MacOS Server v.10.5.8 15.05.2010 16.06.2010 33 0 
9 Sun/Oracle Solaris v.10 17.06.2010 13.07.2010 27 1.48 
10 MS Windows Server 2008 14.07.2010 01.08.2010 19 1.42 
11 Apple MacOS Server-10.5.8 02.08.2010 24.08.2010 23 0 
12 Novel Linux v.11 25.08.2010 02.09.2010 9 1.44 
13 Apple MacOS Server v.10.5.8 03.09.2010 12.09.2010 10 3 
14 MS Windows Server v.2008 13.09.2010 14.09.2010 2 2 
15 Apple MacOS Server v.10.5.8 15.09.2010 15.11.2010 62 1.21 
16 MS Windows Server 2008 16.11.2010 27.12.2010 42 4.86 
17 Sun/Oracle Solaris v.10 28.12.2010 31.12.2010 4 11 
 
As it can be seen from Table 4, the proposed approach to intrusion avoidance allows 
to hold the minimum possible number of residual vulnerabilities dynamically 
switching between diverse operating systems. It reduced the average days-of-risk to 
11.21 and provided 146 vulnerability-free days.  
Table 4. Intrusion avoidance summary. 
Instant number of open 
vulnerabilities Operating system 
Average  
days-of-risk
[13] 
Number of 
vulnerability-
free days max avg 
Novel Linux v.11 73.89 17 45 17.53 
RedHat Linux v.5 106.83 17 63 23.05 
Apple MacOS Server v.10.5.8 46.12 134 25 7.288 
Sun/Oracle Solaris v.10 167.72 12 21 7.871 
MS Windows Server 2008 28.9 27 21 6.466 
Diverse intrusion-avoidance 
architecture with dynamic 
OS reconfiguration 
11.21 146 16 1.7 
During the remaining period of time the average instant number of the residual 
vulnerabilities would be equal to 1.7 that is almost four times as less as the best result 
achieved by Microsoft Windows Server 2008 (6.46 vulnerabilities at once). 
4   Conclusions 
The proposed intrusion-avoidance architecture that makes use of system component 
diversity can significantly improve the overall security of the computing environment 
used to deploy web services. Our work is in line with another recent study [14].  
The approach proposed to intrusion avoidance is based on dynamical reconfiguration 
of the system by selecting and using the particular operating system, web and 
application servers and DBMS that have the minimal number of the residual (yet 
unpatched) vulnerabilities taking also into account their severity. Such strategy allows 
us to dynamically control (and to reduce) the number of residual vulnerabilities and 
their severity by the active and dynamic configuration of the deployment 
environment. This helps the architects to decrease the risks of malicious attacks and 
intrusions. The intrusion-avoidance architecture mainly relies on the cross-platform 
Java technologies and the IaaS cloud services providing the crucial support for 
diversity of the system components, their dynamic reconfiguration and maintenance 
of the spare configurations. The existing vulnerability databases like CVE and NVD 
provide the necessary up-to-date information for the security risk assessment, finding 
the least vulnerable configuration and reconfiguration decision making. The purpose 
of the paper is not to compare the security of various software components. 
Nevertheless, we would like to mention here that the least number of vulnerabilities 
in 2010 were disclosed in Sun/Oracle Solaris v.10, whereas the largest number of 
vulnerability-free days was provided by Apple MacOS Server v.10.5.8. At the same 
time, mainly due to the least days-of-risk, Microsoft ensured the least instant number 
of residual vulnerabilities in its Windows Server 2008. The vast majority of 
vulnerabilities of Novel Linux v.11 and RedHat Linux v.5 were vulnerabilities in the 
Linux core. Thus, they occurred in both operating systems and resulted in the similar 
curves of the cumulative number of vulnerabilities (Fig. 4). However, Novel spent 
more efforts on fixing security problems in its Linux distributive that was resulted in 
the lower days-of-risk (see Table 3).  
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